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3Contemporary Issues of the Americas
The Center for the Study of the Americas at the Copenhagen Business 
School was formed in April 2004 to foster interdisciplinary research and 
analysis of contemporary developments in both north and south America 
particularly those that have a relevance to business and those involved in 
the public policy process. As part of that mission, the Center is publish-
ing concise surveys addressing current events. The series will also make 
the public lectures and presentations given by specialists at events spon-
sored by the Center accessible to a wider audience. Each of the pamphlets 
includes essays that consider a particular historical moment from multiple 
perspectives. The pamphlets will, the Center believes, contribute to the wid-
er, on-going conversation about transatlantic relationships and issues in the 
Americas.
Pamphlet #1: The election of Barack Obama - a new era?
Presidential elections in the United States are at once commonplace events 
and historic occasions. Since the first peaceful transition of power from 
George Washington to John Adams in 1795, presidential elections, while 
constitutionally ordained, have often resembled nothing less than grand 
political dramas with heroic leading actors contesting the foundations of 
American democracy and the meaning of the nation itself. The election of 
Barack Obama as the forty-fourth president of the United States suggested 
just such a drama, as the country elected its first black president in a time of 
war and dire financial crisis. The following essays investigate what Obama’s 
election represents in the light of historical trends as well as pressing con-
temporary problems. The authors do not attempt to offer predictions or 
policy advice; rather they take long-term views on how this particular U.S. 
election can be understood. 
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George W. Bush taking a walk on the last day in office. Foto: Eric Draper/Corbis
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Is “the Age of Reagan” over? I think it is. Just as abortion, opposition to gay 
marriage and other cultural wedge issues seem to have been exhausted for 
the time being, the basic assumptions that for the last three decades have 
guided the American political parties on markets, regulation, taxation and 
the proper role of the federal government no longer seem to apply either. A 
punch-drunk Republican Party has resorted to being “the Party of ‘No’.”
The modern conservative movement was born in reaction to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s New Deal and the new interventionist role of the federal gov-
ernment that it launched.1 For decades, conservatives were well aware that 
they represented a minority view and that the majority of Americans had 
embraced liberal notions of regulated markets and a limited welfare state. 
Conservatism was thus mostly confined to the role as a reactive force that 
in the words of William F. Buckley, Jr. would be “standing athwart history, 
yelling stop.”2 The “Reagan revolution” profoundly changed both this self-
perception and the entire public discourse on the proper role of the govern-
ment. Accordingly, the next three decades deserve to be labeled “the Age of 
Reagan.”In the battle of ideas, liberals were now mostly on the defensive and 
the federal government was once again portrayed as an obstacle to growth.  
Now, the pendulum seems to have swung back. In a twist of fate, the 
greatest economic crisis since the 1930’s has enabled President Obama to 
pick up Ronald Reagan’s mantle and become America’s next transformative 
leader by rejecting his political philosophy and reversing his policies. Bewil-
dered Republicans, who after the elections of 2004 claimed to see evidence 
of a major realignment and the emergence of a solid conservative majority 
in America, now ask “what would Ronald Reagan have done?”
However, the “Reagan revolution” is the wrong place for Republicans to 
search for solutions to their current problems. The confluence of circum-
stances that paved the way for it will not return.
The exhaustion of liberalism
While liberalism was at its last high during Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Great 
Society” in the 1960’s, two things coincided: the “rights revolution” and 
the view that persistent poverty amidst long-term prosperity evidenced ba-
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sic structural problems in the economy. Help from the federal government 
increasingly took the form of entitlements. Likewise, the fact that a rising 
tide evidently did not lift all boats also led social scientists, mostly from the 
liberal side of the political spectrum to study cultural pathologies in the na-
tion’s underclass and advocate social policies that would specifically target 
such problems.
Among the most publicized and controversial examples were Daniel Pat-
rick Moynihan’s 1965-report on The Negro Family: The Case for National 
Action.4 Ironically, as Michael B. Katz has pointed out, the outrage that the 
notion of a “culture of poverty” caused at a time, when pride in racial and 
ethnic identity was high on the agenda, soon made many liberals very reluc-
tant to use it. They did not want to share Moynihan’s fate and be accused of 
harboring an elitist “blame it on the victim”-mentality.5
However, as liberals abstained from using it, conservatives happily took 
over the concept of a “culture of poverty.” During the 1970s, the “War on 
Poverty” was increasingly replaced by a “War on Welfare,” as welfare de-
pendency was added to a growing list of conservative resentments. Many of 
society’s ills were now ascribed to “social engineering” imposed by an out 
of touch-elite. The Republican Party successfully managed to broaden its 
base by reinterpreting the idea of “class struggle” as the struggle between a 
“silent majority” of (white) tax-paying, patriotic and God-loving Americans 
on the one hand, and an unholy alliance of “bleeding heart-liberals” and as-
sorted minority groups on the other.6
As the conservative movement was increasingly joined by new constitu-
encies of social conservatives, “throwing money after problems” was not 
merely seen as fostering helplessness, passivity and dependence, but also as 
promoting immorality. Thus, by the early 1980s, conservative authors such 
as Charles Murray and George Gilder argued that federal programs such as 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) actively undermined the 
idea of the family as the basic unit of American society.7 It was the same 
line of reasoning that Ronald Reagan during his 1976 presidential campaign 
had used successfully to attack “welfare queens driving welfare Cadillacs.”8 
By the time he was sworn in as president in 1981, it had almost become un-
controversial to claim that “government is not the solution to our problems. 
Government is the problem.”9
In most respects Reagan’s attacks on welfare programs simply restated 
traditional views of hard work, family and faith as the proper way out of 
poverty, but he successfully managed to label such views as innovative pol-
icy ideas. Part of his genius was an ability to adopt liberal premises. With 
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Reagan in the White House, the Republican Party was no longer the Party 
of ‘No’. His welfare measures gave the impression that they pursued the 
same ends as liberalism, only with different methods. “Supply-side econom-
ics” was intended to convince low-income voters that they too would benefit 
from conservative economic policies.10 As Reagan’s biographer Lou Cannon 
has noted, “He undermined the New Deal in its own vernacular.”11
The war in Vietnam, the rights revolution, social turmoil in the nation’s 
cities, soaring crime rates, “stagflation,” energy shortages, and not least a 
historical transformation of Southern politics all contributed to the demise 
of Great Society-liberalism. So did the Republicans’ succesful branding of 
their Democratic counterparts as “soft on national security” amidst the 
Soviet threat. All of these factors, combined with Reagan’s cheerful image 
helped broaden the appeal of the Republican Party way beyond what fiscal 
conservatism on its own could offer. Now, a quarter of a century later, in a 
time of severe economic recession, Republicans, ironically, seem to believe 
that fiscal conservatism can restore the Reagan-coalition for them.
Not only is there no new Reagan waiting on the sidelines of the Repub-
lican Party: there is every reason to doubt that fiscal conservatism and anti-
statist posturing will lead to victory in the coming years. First of all, a signifi-
cantly higher percentage of Americans seem to have a more positive view of 
government intervention and less fear that it will lead down a slippery slope 
to socialism (even that term seems less frightening to new generation raised 
after the end of the Cold War).12 Some have pointed to “Hurricane Katrina” 
and the flooding of New Orleans in 2005 as a turning point. Likewise, the 
recent exposure of rampant and unregulated greed in the financial sector 
has prompted demands for more government regulation. Yet, most Ameri-
can conservatives seem to be stuck with the slogans of the Reagan era.
Some leading conservatives are indeed talking about the imperative of 
fresh ideas and new policies before the movement can make a comeback. 
Former House Majority Leader Newt Gingrich and Utah Governor Jon M. 
Huntsman, Jr. are among them and both possible presidential contenders 
in 2012.13 However, other parts of the movement have no intention of mov-
ing out of the Reagan-era. To them, the essential question to all political 
problems is still “what would Ronald Reagan do?” and they usually reach a 
conclusion that is strangely at odds with the actual historical record of the 
Reagan years: the party needs to move further to the right in order to win 
back the presidency and seats in Congress.
Ironically, this perception is probably reinforced by Republican losses 
in the last two elections. There are 50 Republican members fewer after the 
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2008 election and most of those who have survived the onslaught tend to 
come from secure conservative districts. Accordingly, they are less likely to 
turn into “me-too Republicans” in search of bipartisan compromises with 
the Democratic majorities. They might also find support for their impres-
sions of a hidden conservative vote from watching Sarah Palin-rallies.
Yet, there is very little support to be found in opinion polls. Actually, 
the Bush policies that conservatives decry as political treason, such as the 
vastly expensive prescription drug benefits, are among the very few of his 
domestic initiatives that were popular with a large majority of Americans.14 
Likewise, the poll-numbers for the Republican Party declined even further 
(to 26 percent) after their almost unified resistance to the Obama adminis-
tration’s stimulus plan in February 2009.15
Furthermore, there are new areas of major public concern, where the 
Reagan-formula will no longer work either. Among them are the issues of 
global warming and the dependency on fossil fuels. President Carter’s con-
cern for the environment in the 1970s was dismissed by conservatives as 
unwarranted doom and gloom. While Carter had talked about the struggle 
for energy conservation and against pollution, global warming and depen-
dence on foreign oil as “the moral equivalent of war,” Reagan scored points 
by assuring the American public that there was no need to worry. In his 
brand of “conservatism without tears,” there were no limits to what Ameri-
cans could achieve and no limits to what they could consume. 
In public memory, Reagan became the president who ended the gas lines 
and lowered the price of oil (none of which, of course, he had much influ-
ence on). During his presidency, he successfully rolled back government 
standards for fuel efficiency in American cars. In 1983, he dismissed warn-
ings about global warming issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency. Symbolically, he even took down the solar panels that Carter had 
installed at the roof of the White House.16 The Reaganites were convinced 
that the market or technological solutions to such problems would show 
up in due time. Today most Americans know otherwise. That hasn’t pre-
vented Republican leaders such as House Minority Leader John Boehner 
from trying the Reagan approach. In April 2009, he described “the idea 
that carbon dioxide is a carcinogen that is harmful to our environment” as 
“almost comical.”17
Are there any viable roads to a conservative comeback?
So what will conservatives rely on in the immediate future, absent any new 
political ideas? Populist rage? More tax cuts? Making a showcase of fiscal re-
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straint? Conservatives might attempt to tap into populist rage by connecting 
the dots between Wall Street, liberal media and a liberal intelligentsia, and 
strengthen the image of the Republican Party as the fiscally conservative 
party of Main Street and the nation’s “Joe the Plumbers.” However, even 
that will be difficult to pull off after eight years, where a large part of the 
middle class feels that it has been “plundered from above.” It might also 
prove difficult to sell the idea that President Obama has launched “class war-
fare” by making the tax system somewhat less biased in favor of the richest 
5 percent of Americans.18 Too many Americans might still recall that George 
W. Bush’s 2001 tax cuts gave the richest 1 percent of the taxpayers some 45 
percent of the benefits.19
Many voters might furthermore be offended by the sheer hypocrisy of 
fiscal restraint now, after the Bush administration, helped by Republican 
majorities in both houses, has created the largest federal deficit in Ameri-
can history. Just a few years ago, leading conservatives characterized the 
president’s fiscal irresponsibility as Hamiltonian “big-government conser-
vatism.”20
Even if conservatives could manage to distance themselves from George 
W. Bush and hold on to Reagan as the movement’s standard bearer, they 
would still be throwing stones from glass houses. The Reagan administra-
tion had many virtues, but fiscal conservatism was not one of them. As a 
matter of fact, Reagan created what was then the largest deficit in American 
history and added a couple of trillion dollars to the national debt.21 Until re-
cently, leading conservatives had no problem with that. Vice President Dick 
Cheney famously told Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill that the lesson of the 
Reagan-years was that “deficits don’t matter,” and the conservative Heritage 
Foundation in 2004 defended Reagan’s deficits by arguing that they “ig-
nited the largest economic boom in American history.22
Given the record of the Bush years, perhaps the most realistic hope 
for a Republican resurgence right now is the one that only talk-radio host 
Rush Limbaugh and a few other prominent conservative figures dare say 
in public: the failure of President Obama and his “big bang theory” of sav-
ing the economy and enacting his entire political program all at once.23 If 
he succeeds, Republicans are of course likely to spend years more in the 
political wilderness, but it might give them time to move beyond Reagan. If 
President Obama and the Democratic majorities in Congress fail, the GOP 
might make a comeback as early as the mid-term elections in November 
2010. However, absent any new ideas – particularly ideas that might make 
it possible for the party to reach out to new constituencies – that would be a 
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pyrrhic victory. Ronald Reagan would have understood that.
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The Obama Offer
On January 20, 2009, well over a million people attended the inaugura-
tion of Barack Obama as the forty-fourth president of the United States.  By 
almost any standard, it was a remarkable outpouring of goodwill and enthu-
siasm that echoed an equally enthusiastic sentiment around the world. But 
does the enthusiasm generated by Obama’s election mean something? Can 
he do something with the goodwill and, so far, high approval ratings?
Yes he can, because like every other new president he has an oppor tu nity 
to define a moment. At the same time, of course, Obama also understands 
that goodwill will not end the crises that rack the United States. So how will 
Obama turn goodwill into success? He will need to contend with a formula 
that makes such opportunities successful. He will need to recognize how 
defining moments become defining movements.
A defining moment is only as successful as the offer a president makes 
to the people. And the success such an offer depends on a president’s ability 
to resolve the natural tension between how history is made and how history 
is understood. In other words, when a president reacts to a contemporary 
crisis – and surely there will be a crisis – any solution he or she offers must 
reflect the kind of abiding American tradition that resonates with the pub-
lic’s collective memory. Put simply, a president has to deliver guns, butter, 
and ideals.
In being reflective as well as reactive, a president combines the wisdom 
of Karl Marx as well as the American founders. One must keep in mind, as 
Marx famously counseled, that “Men make their own history, but they do 
not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circum-
stances, but under circumstances existing already, given and trans mitted 
from the past.” But it is equally important to remember that in the United 
States, Americans interpret contemporary crises – those already existing cir-
cumstances – through a romanticized understanding of their nation’s histo-
ry. Solutions to crises must transcend the immediate moment and connect 
to popular notions of the nation’s founding and purpose.
The Presidential Test
Every president must submit to this test, but let’s review those presidents 
relevant to Barack Obama’s moment. Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his 
New Deal are often used as models for what Obama must do today. What 
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President-Elect Barack Obama is sworn in by Chief Justice John Roberts, January 20, 2009.  Foto: Chad J. McNeeley/Corbis
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did FDR offer and how did he turn his moment into a movement? FDR 
offered the New Deal as a way to save capitalism. By doing this he respond-
ed to a desperate economic imperative by saving banks, creating jobs, and 
providing hope of better days ahead. But he also reflected a fundamental 
American faith in capitalism; he didn’t merely support an abstract notion 
of the market but created the feeling that the government would rescue the 
American economy because it remained the best system to reward hard 
work. Contrast FDR with a president who most avidly claimed his mantle, 
Lyndon Baines Johnson. LBJ offered the Great Society as the logical fruition 
of the New Deal. But Johnson failed to understand his contemporary mo-
ment – so intent was he on waging a war on poverty as well as a war against 
communism that his Great Society collapsed under its own weight. By all 
accounts, LBJ was a masterful politician, but even he had to abide by the 
simple political maxim of calibrating what is possible with what is likely.
Consider another pair of contrasts, two presidents who have direct rel-
evance to the world Obama has inherited, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. 
These two presidents are often posed as opposites, with Carter viewed as a 
failure and Reagan as a success, even though many of Carter’s warnings and 
policy initiatives seem prophetic to us today. So why has history judged Cart-
er so harshly? Consider what Carter offered. He believed the nation needed 
a period of national healing, something that seemed reasonable given the 
traumas of Vietnam and Watergate. Yet, he failed to understand that while 
the nation was in a way damaged, it craved more than therapy. His promise 
to be honest and better than his predecessors fell short of a tradition that 
he had to reflect: Americans wanted priests not prophets. Ronald Reagan 
ministered to the public by providing a gospel of optimism. He offered to re-
lieve Americans of the burden government had become, to welcome a “new 
morning” of sunny individualism. In this way he reacted to stagflation and 
the general displeasure many people felt toward their government, while 
reflecting the American impulse of individuality. Not surprisingly, Reagan 
was an admirer of FDR and Obama has recorded his admiration for Reagan. 
Obama might understand and perhaps learn from LBJ and Carter, but he 
would be smart to model himself after Reagan.
This might sound counter-intuitive. After all, didn’t Obama’s election 
mark the end of the conservative era Reagan inaugurated? And how can 
Obama claim Reagan’s legacy when his immediate predecessor, George W. 
Bush, has already done so? The answer lies, of course, in Obama’s offer.
The Obama Offer
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Obama’s Offer
During the campaign, Obama positioned himself as the “change” candi-
date. We might dismiss such a claim as mere electoral rhetoric. Yet, for 
Obama it works on two levels. First, to win the election, Obama had to make 
himself the most convincing “not-Bush” candidate. After all, many Ameri-
cans linked the outgoing president to the two biggest problems facing the 
nation – the economy and the war in Iraq. Thus on one level, Obama em-
ployed a common electoral strategy by clearly distinguishing himself from 
the widely unpopular president. Similarly, FDR was not Hoover; Reagan 
was not Carter.
But it is on a second level that Obama’s idea of change has the potential 
to turn his moment into a movement. Obama has promised in his inaugu-
ral address to make government work for the people. By doing so, he has 
reacted to crises – both foreign and domestic – that created the conditions 
of his time. Furthermore, his offer reflects an abiding hope, as his favorite 
president said, that “this government of the people, by the people, for the 
people shall not perish from the earth.” His offer then, just like those of 
FDR and Reagan, has not so much ended an era in American history as 
changed the conversation among Americans.1 What joins all three of these 
presidents is the fact that as one national conversation languished, they of-
fered a new one to take its place. For FDR that meant creating new terms 
in which to understand the presidency and the benefits of executive power. 
From 1932 to 1980, this conversation dominated American politics. With 
his election, Reagan did not so much end the institutions of the New Deal 
– in fact, the conservative revolutionaries that acted in his name also left it 
largely unchanged – but redirected the public conversation away from the 
failings of the federal government and toward the dynamic potential of the 
individual in American society. Like FDR, Reagan didn’t so much contend 
with the old conversation as simply replace with one he could sell because 
he believed in it. Along these lines, Obama does not represent the end of 
conservatism in America. If anything he has inherited a nation that is so far 
away from conservative principles of small government, balanced budgets, 
and free market capitalism that all Obama would need to do is declare the 
ascendancy of the new liberal era and call it a day.
Rather, Obama has declared an end to a particular era of revanchist poli-
tics.2 Recently, the charge of placing party loyalty above civic responsibility 
has been leveled at the Republicans and conservatives. However, Obama 
made clear in his inaugural address that he finds the problem not with one 
party but with an entire era – the 1960s. As he is happy to point out, he was 
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not even a teenager when the sixties ended and therefore cannot be blamed 
for nor does he need to fight the battles of that era. In the first few minutes 
of his address, he declared: “On this day, we come to proclaim an end to 
the petty grievances and false promises, the recriminations and worn-out 
dogmas that for far too long have strangled our politics.” While this state-
ment undoubtedly applies to the eight years that immediately preceded his 
administration, Obama directed his public’s attention to a new question: 
“not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works, 
whether it helps families find jobs at a decent wage, care they can afford, a 
retirement that is dignified.” Obama has offered a new conversation to re-
place the one that Reagan had offered to replace the one FDR had begun. Of 
course, the question now is whether Obama’s offer will succeed.
From Moment to Movement
So does this mean that Obama’s movement will be bi-partisan and non-
ideological? No, but of course neither were the successful movements cre-
ated by FDR and Reagan. Like them, Obama will ask people to move beyond 
their present points of reference. He will need to explain that the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan are not Vietnam; that the struggle against terrorism 
is not the same as the struggle against communism; and that the financial 
crisis is neither the Great Depression nor the stagflation of the 1970s and 
early 1980s. He will need to create a new set of terms – start a new conversa-
tion – because the present crises are not a replay of the past.
Therefore, when Obama stood as the elected president before that great 
throng of people, he did so as a black man who is a product of the Civil 
Rights movement, but not a partisan within it. He stood as a member of a 
generation that no longer needs to resolve the memories, scars, and legacies 
of an era that has dominated the last forty years of American politics. And he 
stood, as he has made clear throughout the early days of his presidency, as a 
successor to Lincoln. This is a smart choice for reasons that are both appar-
ent and conveniently overlooked. Lincoln remains the bi-partisan favorite 
among the public and historians. He is that mythological political giant who 
kept the nation whole; who altered the way future generations of Americans 
understood their relationship to the nation and its history. But he was also 
a president who was despised by nearly half the American population and 
who believed so thoroughly in his understanding of the nation that he was 
willing to fight a war to prove it. Obama has good reason to channel Lincoln 
because he was a gutsy political scrapper who never lost sight of the need to 
provide a vision that transcended his specific and very violent moment.
The Obama Offer
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It is my hope, and it should be Obama’s as well, that he will not need to 
become Lincoln; that he will not need to guide the nation through tragedy 
and toward redemption. Yet, conditions are so poor that it appears Obama 
will have his opportunity to make his moment into a movement – if only to 
revive a nation in dire need of inspiration. And while we might talk about 
Obama’s election as an end or a beginning, what matters is whether this 
president can transform good will into policy. To do this, it seems to me 
Obama can’t do much better than to strike a balance between the wisdom of 
Marx and the American Founders; to learn from the examples of FDR and 
Reagan; and to appreciate the tragedy as well as the triumph of Lincoln’s 
accomplishment.
NOTES
1 See Mark Lilla’s talk to the Carnegie Council on his book The Stillborn God; Religion, Politics, 
and the Modern West (New York: Knopf, 2007) in which he points out that Thomas Hobbes 
”changed the conversation” about the role of religion in politics.
2 See Sam Tanenhaus, ”Conservatism is Dead,” New Republic, http://www.tnr.com/politics/
story.html?id=9dfd540a-3d44-4684-a333-415ef34efa5b
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Enter Stage Left: Obama 
and the Politics of Change
Barack Obama ran for president on an ambitious, progressive platform of 
change. Among his proposals was an end to the war in Iraq, universal health 
care, a focus on renewable energy resources, and a rewriting of the tax code 
that would raise taxes for those making over $250,000 a year and provide a 
tax break for the middle- and lower classes.
The Republi id not see America as you and I see America.”
A number of commentators seemed to agree with Palin. A few weeks be-
fore the election, the cover story of Newsweek trumpeted “America the Con-
servative.” In the accompanying article, “It’s Not Easy Bein’ Blue,” editor Jon 
Meacham issued a gentle warning to the Democratic presidential candidate: 
“Should Obama win, he will have to govern a nation that is more instinc-
tively conservative than it is liberal – a perennial reality that past Democratic 
presidents have ignored at their peril.”1 The leader of the House Republi-
cans, John Boehner, was more emphatic. “America remains a center-right 
country,” Boehner insisted. “Democrats should not make the mistake of 
viewing Tuesday’s results as repudiation of conservatism or a validation of 
big government. Neither should we.”2
There is, however, another way to interpret the results of the 2008 elec-
tion – that the nation has in fact been trending left on a variety of issues. 
The unraveling of the conservative era began to take hold in 2005, with 
Bush’s failed attempt to privatize Social Security, the administration’s in-
competence in handling the aftermath of hurricane Katrina, and escalating 
violence in Iraq.
The Republican Malaise
One of the reasons why the Republican attacks on Obama were so ineffec-
tive was that it was Republican conservatism, not Democratic progressivism, 
which was out of sync with the country. The same week that Meacham of-
fered his opinion that the US was a conservative nation, Ruy Teixeira found 
that the opposite was the case. Citing a Pew Research poll, Teixeira argued 
that the Republican characterization of Obama as a socialist redistributor 
didn’t resonate with the public primarily because they agreed with Obama 
that tax policy should be reformed. According to the Pew poll, 62% of Amer-
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icans wanted to repeal the Bush tax cuts for the wealthy, while only 25% 
wanted to make them permanent. The same poll found that 58% favored 
the government guaranteeing health insurance for all Americans, even if it 
meant raising taxes. Only 35% were opposed.3
A good many Republicans recognize that there is a real danger that the 
party will be consigned to minority status for the foreseeable future. Speak-
ing to Republican leaders, the Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-
KY) expressed his fear that the Republican Party would become a minority 
party.
You can walk from Canada to Mexico and from Maine to Arizona 
without ever leaving a state with a Democratic governor. Not a single 
Republican senator represents the tens of millions of Americans on the 
West Coast. And on the East Coast, you can drive from North Caro-
lina to New Hampshire without touching a single state in between 
that has a Republican in the U.S. Senate.
McConnell’s anxiety about a geographical trend working against the Repub-
licans is well-founded. Since 1988, progressives have seen gains in not only 
metropolitan areas, but in the suburbs and in exurbia.4
The question is of course how to reverse this trend. A number of conser-
vatives openly acknowledge that the GOP needs to remake itself to appeal 
to a wider demographic. As longtime Republican political adviser Michael 
Murphy put it on the Sunday morning TV program Meet the Press, the 
party needs to modernize conservatism by reaching out to groups that the 
party has alienated. He pointed out that Ronald Reagan may have won the 
election of 1980 with 51% of the vote, but if the election were held in 2008, 
with the current demographics, he would have received only 47% of the 
vote.5
Murphy’s comments came as a response to a clip showing radio talk 
show host Rush Limbaugh at the Conservative Political Action Commit-
tee (CPAC) meeting the week before. Limbaugh had been criticized for 
expressing the hope that Obama would fail. Limbaugh defended his state-
ment at the CPAC meeting, asking why would he want Obama to succeed 
in his “mission…to restructure and reform this country so that capitalism 
and individual liberty are not its foundation.”6
Limbaugh’s rhetoric is a continuation of the kind of invective that lost 
the Republicans the election of 2008. Limbaugh, however, is not alone. 
Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal, widely regarded as a potential candidate 
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for president in 2012, gave the GOP response to Obama’s address to the na-
tion on February 24. Jindal chose that moment to de liver the tired nostrum 
about government being the problem, going so far as to argue that Bush’s 
failure to offer adequate help to the residents of New Orleans and the Gulf 
after hurricane Katrina in some way proved the inefficiency of government 
itself rather than the incompetence of the Bush administration.
By engaging in the politics of resentment and racial backlash over the 
past three decades, the Republicans have painted themselves into a demo-
graphic corner. Obama won the minority vote (comprised pri marily of three 
main groups – African Americans, Latinos, and Asians) overwhelmingly. As 
John Judis has pointed out, minorities made up 26% of the vote in 2008, 
an increase of over double that of 1972, when minorities accounted for only 
10% of the vote. The groups comprising the emerging Democratic majority 
– women, minorities, union members, the young, and independents – are 
growing, while the traditional white working-class has shrunk precipitously 
from a clear majority of the workforce before World War II (58% in 1940), to 
just a 25% in 2006.7 Obama received 66% of the vote to McCain’s 32% from 
the so-called Millennial Generation – those born between 1978 and 2000. 
This group, a majority of which holds progressive views, is adding 4.5 mil-
lion potential new voters every year.8
The Obama Agenda
However, it would be to indulge in a form of demographic fatalism to claim 
that any lasting transformation of the American political landscape will sim-
ply unfold inevitably. In order to sustain the leftward turn of large segments 
of the American public, Obama recognizes that he has to not only make 
good on his campaign promises. The symbiotic relationship between the in-
terests of the constituencies that comprise the emerging Democratic major-
ity and the efforts by the Obama administration to advance those interests 
will determine whether the election of 2008 will mark the beginning of a 
long-term change in the American political landscape.
Obama’s speech to the nation on February 24, 2009 laid out a sweeping 
agenda for progressive reform and massive public investment that echoed 
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society. It built 
on the issues that he had been speaking about on the campaign trail. Two ar-
eas of change that Obama spoke of during the campaign are health care re-
form and unionization. Both enjoy widespread public support. Indications 
are that Obama will succeed in implementing change in both these areas.
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The Future of Unions
In a poll covering a 70-year period from the New Deal era to the most re-
cent mid-term elections (1936 to 2006), Gallup found that a majority of 
American approved of labor unions even though support has diminished 
somewhat in the past 3 decades.9 However, union membership rose for the 
second year in a row in 2008 for the first time since 1983, according to the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.10
Passage of the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), which would make 
it easier for workers to form unions, is a top legislative priority for the la-
bor union movement and would likely result in further increases in union 
membership.
A new version of EFCA was introduced in both houses of Congress in 
March, 2009. During the campaign, the Service Employees International 
Union (SEIU) ran an ad featuring Obama expressing his support for the 
EFCA and saying unequivocally that ”it’s time we had a president who hon-
ors organized labor, who has walked on picket lines, who doesn’t choke on 
the word union.” He ended by urging voters to ”reclaim the idea that oppor-
tunity is open to anyone who is willing to work for it.”11
Organized labor contributed heavily to Obama’s campaign because it 
saw him as a supporter of unions. The labor union movement was therefore 
encouraged by Obama’s nomination of Hilda Solis to be Secretary of Labor. 
Solis was the first Latina to be elected to Congress. She served 5 terms in the 
House of Representatives, representing the 32nd congressional district in 
California that includes East Los Angeles.
Solis’s selection was positively received by the union movement for two 
reasons. She has long been a vocal advocate for EFCA. The EFCA is a top 
priority for the union movement, which hopes for early passage of the legis-
lation under the new administration. Furthermore, as the daughter of Mexi-
can and Nicaraguan immigrants, Solis also represents one of the fastest 
growing minority groups within the labor movement.
Upon first hearing of Obama’s choice of Solis, SEIU President Andy 
Stern exclaimed “It’s extraordinary. On every issue that’s important to us, 
she has stood up for an America where everyone’s hard work is valued and 
rewarded.” After often contentious Senate hearings, Solis was confirmed in 
February.
Many Republican were staunchly opposed to Solis’s nomination, pri-
marily because of her support for the EFCA. Mitch McConnell raised the 
specter of Europeanization in connection with a bill he characterized as “an 
outrageous proposal. It will fundamentally harm America and Europeanize 
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America and we will have a big political fight over this.” Bernie Marcus, 
cofounder and former CEO of Home Depot, went one step further and la-
mented that passage of the act would be ”the demise of civilization.”
The intention of the bill is the exact opposite of the caricature presented 
by Republicans and conservative businessmen and pundits. The National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), an independent federal agency charged 
with conducting workplace elections for union representation, has been 
weakened since Roosevelt’s day. After workers submit a formal request to 
organize, the NLRB schedules a secret-ballot vote. In the ensuing month 
or more, companies are free to hire anti-union consultants and use scare 
tactics such as spreading rumors that the workplace might close if the union 
is approved. In such a coercive environment, simply signing cards would 
facilitate union organization.
An earlier version of the bill, co-sponsored by then-Senator Obama, 
passed the House in 2007, but Senate Republicans succeeded in blocking 
a vote on the bill that year. Solis voted for the bill and Obama expressed his 
support for it during the campaign. The Obama administration hopes to 
see the EFCA passed in 2009, despite the defection of Arkansas Democrat 
Blanche Lincoln, whose state is home to the corporate headquarters of Wal-
mart, which has vigorously opposed the legislation.
Health Care for All
In 1993, the Clinton administration proposed comprehensive health care 
reform. It was defeated. The 1994 mid-term election was called a ”referen-
dum on big government” and the Republicans won control of both houses 
of Congress for the first time in forty years.
Opposition to Clinton’s health care reform was fierce. The conservative 
commentator William Kristol provided the ideological rationale for Repub-
licans to strike down any health care reform legislation. In an  op-ed in The 
Wall Street Journal, he wrote, ”Passage of the Clinton health care plan in 
any form would be disastrous. It would guarantee an unprecedented federal 
intrusion into the American economy. Its success would signal the rebirth 
of centralized welfare-state policy.”12 In other words, a successful health care 
plan that could garner widespread public support could pose a threat to Re-
publicans who were against any form of government intervention.
In 2007, President Bush vetoed legislation passed by Congress to in-
crease funding for the State Children’s Health Insurance Plan (SCHIP). 
SCHIP was established in 1997 to cover uninsured children from families 
with incomes too high to qualify for Medicaid, but who cannot afford private 
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insurance.
The bill would have expanded SCHIP by $60 billion over 5 years to cov-
er an additional 3.3 million children who remained uninsured and conse-
quently received no health care.
In vetoing the bill, Bush echoed Kristol in expressing concern for the 
consequences of such legislation: “when you expand eligibility...you’re really 
beginning to open up an avenue for people to switch from private insurance 
to the government.” Polls taken after Bush’s veto showed that Democrats 
and independents overwhelmingly supported the bill. Even a narrow major-
ity of Republican favored expansion.13
An SCHIP bill was one of the first pieces of legislation to pass the 
Democratic Congress after Obama’s inauguration. It would allow 7 million 
children to continue receving coverage and would expand coverage to an 
additional 4 million children. In addition, the five-year waiting period for 
children of legal immigrants was eliminated. In signing the bill, Obama 
declared: “The way I see it, providing coverage to 11 million children through 
CHIP is a down payment on my commitment to cover every single Ameri-
can.”14
Once again, Republicans opposed to the bill argued against creeping gov-
ernment intervention in the health care system. As Senator Jim DeMint 
(R-SC) put it, “This debate [over SCHIP] had nothing to do with children….
It had everything to do with making more Americans dependent on the 
government for their health care.”15
The push for comprehensive health care reform and passage of the 
EFCA, two unabashedly liberal issues, are just two examples of how the 
Obama administration plans to use the support of the emerging Democratic 
majority to turn the country left of center. The election indicated widespread 
support for these and other liberal issues. It will be Obama’s task, working 
with the Democratic Congress, to turn this support into legislation.
William Kristol had it right in 1994. He was writing on the cusp of the 
Gingrich revolution that openly attempted to roll back the New Deal. Ten 
years later, President Bush followed in Gingrich’s footsteps by proposing 
partial privatization of Social Security. His proposal met with widespread 
opposition and was dropped. Obama is promising the return to activist gov-
ernment that was Kristol’s nightmare. That’s why Limbaugh doesn’t want 
Obama to succeed. He knows that Obama’s success would consign the con-
servative movement to minority status for at least a generation. 
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“Yes We Can” and “No We Can’t”: 
Change and the 2008 Presidential 
Election
The watchword of the 2008 presidential election was “change”. Indeed, 
some commentators have gone beyond the slogan (which was initially used 
by the Obama campaign to represent Hillary Clinton as the candidate who 
did not want change) and talk of realignment. The 2008 election, they have 
said, marked a retreat from the economic and cultural conservatism of 
former years amongst large swathes of the electorate. It was a critical or 
realigning election.1 The Democrats had established a basis for long-term 
electoral and ideological hegemony. For some on both the left and right, 
the US was becoming a “center-left” or “Europeanized” nation. As Harold 
Meyerson wrote in The Washington Post:
Even though Obama’s victory was nowhere near as numerically lopsided 
as Franklin Roosevelt’s in 1932, his margins among decisive and growing 
constituencies make clear that this was a genuinely realigning election.2
Although Mike Davis has also pointed to shifts in the character of the 
suburbs, brought about in part by the expanding housing market, these 
commentators owe much to the conclusions drawn in John Judis and Ruy 
Teixeira’s 2002 book, The Emerging Democratic Majority. Published just 
ahead of mid-term elections in which the Republicans made significant 
gains, Judis and Teixeira talked of a realignment based upon the growing 
weight of minorities within the electorate and the rise of highly-educated 
professionals and, as a consequence, the growth of “ideopolises”. The full 
character and extent of the realignment would, they argued in a later article, 
depend upon the ability of Democrats to enact “landmark legislation” that 
would solidify the allegiance of coming generations to the party. 
Long-term trends are, however, always vulnerable to disruption by ex-
ternal shocks. Judis and Teixeira argue that the September 11th attacks and 
the “war on terror” that followed in their wake held back the swing to the 
Democrats that they had identified: 
The focus on the war on terror not only distracted erstwhile Democrats 
and independents but appeared to transform, or de-arrange, their political 
worldview. They temporarily became more sympathetic to a whole range of 
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conservative assumptions and approaches. In the past, voters had trusted 
Democrats to manage the economy, and in 2002 that preference should 
have been strongly reinforced by a recession that occurred on Bush’s watch. 
Instead, voters in that election believed by 41 percent to 37 percent that Re-
publicans were “more likely to make sure the country is prosperous” … op-
position to abortion also followed the same curve. The percentage of voters 
who believed that abortion should be “illegal in all circumstances” (based on 
Gallup Poll annual averages) rose from 17 percent, in 2000, to 20 percent, 
in 2002, and was still at 19 percent in 2004.3
Against this background, the Bush-Cheney ticket narrowly won re-elec-
tion in November 2004. Once, however, the shock waves created by 9/11 
had receded, the Democrats began to make the gains forecast by those who 
either explicitly or implicitly talked of realignment. The party secured con-
trol of Congress in November 2006 and, two years later, regained the White 
House. Obama’s share of the popular vote (53 per cent) was the highest 
gained by a Democratic presidential candidate since Lyndon Johnson’s land-
slide in 1964.  
Realignment reconsidered
Nonetheless, despite the attractions that it holds for the committed parti-
sans who back whichever party seems hegemonic at a particular moment in 
time, the concept of realignment is heavily contested. 4 In his 2004 book, 
Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre, David R. Mayhew 
points out, for example, that it is much more difficult to talk of a dominant 
party in a particular era than realignment theorist suggest. In practice, the 
parties are often finely balanced. Furthermore, few presidential elections re-
ally “fit” the criteria around which the concept is constructed.5
Alongside these generalised conceptual difficulties, there are particular 
problems applying the concept of realignment to the 2008 election. Firstly, 
there has been no sizeable swing to the Democrats in terms of party loyal-
ties and allegiances. Indeed, identification with the Democrats held broadly 
steady over the years. According to Gallup polling, it rose to 36 per cent 
in 2008 compared to 34 per cent in 2000 but that is barely noteworthy. 
Furthermore, 36 per cent places Democratic identification at the same level 
it was in 1988, the year the party lost the White House to George H. W. 
Bush.6 
Secondly, if the ratings of Congressional Democrats are added to the pic-
ture it becomes abundantly clear that there is no particular enthusiasm for 
the party. Throughout 2009 (and the figures are similar in earlier years), 
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those who held “unfavorable” opinions of Congressional Democrats out-
numbered those who had “favorable attitudes”. The findings for the Demo-
crats’ leaders on Capitol Hill, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Ma-
jority Leader Harry Reid, are even worse.7 
Thirdly, there has been no systematic, systematic or comprehensive shift 
in the character or distribution of political opinion. In other words, although 
there have been “spikes” resulting from responses to particular crises such 
as Hurricane Katrina or the Great Financial Crisis there is a significant dis-
tinction between fluctuations and a trend. The concept of “realignment” 
rests upon a trend or trends. Those who talk of a Democratic realignment 
have to show that attitudes have moved leftwards. However, while there has 
been a small rise in the proportion of the population describing themselves 
as “liberal” there has been a parallel rise in the proportion calling itself 
“conservative”. Furthermore, if the “liberals” are examined more closely, the 
National Election Studies statistics suggest that they are for the most part 
“slightly liberal”. There has been a swing back towards a faith in govern-
ment over the past fifteen years, but 1994 was the high-water mark for anti-
government populist conservatism. Popular attitudes at the beginning of 
the 1990s were informed and structured by cases of Congressional corrup-
tion, a belief that taxes were far too high, President Bush’s abandonment of 
his pledge that there would be “no new taxes”, a federal government budget 
deficit that seemed to symbolize government profligacy, and a growing fear 
of the global market. From that point, attitudes towards government could 
also become less hostile. However, if a longer-term perspective is adopted, 
there has been a rightward shift since the mid-century years. The ideas that 
were shaped by the New Deal, wartime egalitarianism and government 
planning have given way to self-reliant individualism. Whereas 57 per cent 
of those asked said in 1956 that “the government in Washington ought to 
see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job“, just 21 per cent 
subscribed to this in 2002.8 
The extent to which Obama’s election constitutes an epochal break with 
the country’s racial past should also be qualified. Whereas most of the 
country swung, albeit to a greater or lesser extent, from the Re pu blicans 
to the Democrats between 2004 and 2008, 9 per cent of voters swung the 
other way. Larry Bartels notes that Obama’s gains “..relative to Kerry were 
significantly smaller in states with large numbers of African-Americans – 
a pattern disguised in the overall vote totals by his strong support among 
African-Americans themselves.”9 
In other words, 2008 was much more a victory for Obama personally 
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than it was for the Democrats or the ideas with which they are associated. 
There are important attitudinal gaps that will almost certainly have political 
consequences in the years to come. Obama secured 53% of the overall vote. 
If CNN’s figure for Democratic identification in 2008 is used, 39 per cent 
(rather than the 36 per cent reported in Gallup polls) is used, identification 
with the Democrats on 39 per cent.10 Of these 89 per cent backed Obama 
rather than McCain. As also noted, “liberal” identification was only 22 per 
cent or just over a fifth of the voters. Similarly 89 per cent of these voters sup-
ported Obama. Earlier datasets suggest that a majority or, at the least, a large 
plurality of these “liberals” regard themselves as “slightly liberal”. In ANES 
surveys only very small numbers described themselves as simply “liberal” or 
“extremely liberal”.11 In other words, a significant proportion of the 2008 vot-
ers backed Obama without being Democratic identifiers while an even larger 
proportion supported his candidacy without in any way subscribing to liberal 
forms of thinking. Although incoming presidents always face gaps of this 
type, they were particularly large in 2008. This was partly because Obama’s 
margin of victory was convincing but also because long-term Democratic 
identification has been slow to rise and relatively few Americans are willing 
to embrace either the term “liberalism” or most of its defining tenets. 
Party allegiances
In place of realignment, there is a case for revisiting the concept of dealign-
ment. This suggests that the electorate is increasingly detached from the 
parties and former allegiances have been weakened. There was widespread 
talk of dealignment during the 1970s, particularly in the wake of the Viet-
nam war and Watergate. It was seemingly confirmed by declining levels of 
party identification and an increase in split-ticket voting. 12 Dealignment was 
however abandoned amidst signs of growing partisanship and polarisation 
from the 1980s onwards. In an era when the parties have been popularly 
defined by figures such as Newt Gingrich, Tom DeLay and more recently on 
the Democratic side, Rahm Emanuel, talk of dealignment appeared to be an 
eccentric anachronism.
However, this judgement should be reconsidered. As Russell Dalton has 
argued, partisan attachments should be considered in other ways beyond 
simply looking at the proportion of the electorate who, at any particular 
point in time, express a sense of identification with one of the parties. Will-
ingness to change allegiances is also important. In earlier decades, there 
was a high level of stability. Individuals often inherited partisan loyalties 
from their parents and maintained that loyalties throughout their lifetime. 
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Even if they sometimes engaged in “deviant” voting, the strength of party 
identification would bring them back to their original identity.
Over recent decades, there has been a weakening of inter-generational 
partisanship or the extent to which partisanship is inherited from parents 
between the 1950s and the 1990s. Individuals are less likely to identify with 
the same party as their parents. Furthermore, individuals are also more 
likely to shift their party attachment at times during their lifetime. In other 
words, both inter-generational partisanship and intra-generational partisan-
ship have weakened.13
Pew studies show what has happened to party identification in the first 
few months of 2009. Both major parties lost identifiers. Between December 
2008 and April 2009, Democratic identification fell from 39 per cent to 33 
per cent and Republican identification dropped from 26 per cent to 22 per 
cent.14 Although we would always expect a degree of political disengagement 
following an election, these are major shifts that challenge the claims of 
those accustomed to seeing party identification as broadly constant, at least 
in the short-term.
Consequences
Two conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, there is a sizeable gap between the 
Obama vote and the extent to which there is partisan or ideological identi-
fication with the Democrats. All of this may limit the new administration’s 
freedom of action. Despite the hopes of his cheerleaders who talk of a far-
reaching realignment, all the early evidence suggests that the White House 
will, despite the severity of the economic collapse, pursue a moderate and 
restrained course. To the chagrin of radicals, many Obama appointees for-
merly served in the Clinton administration. Secondly, although it should 
not be overstated, there is some evidence of growing detachment from the 
parties. This suggests that even if the Obama administration holds back 
from taking radical initiatives, the outcome of presidential and Congressio-
nal elections in the years to come is very uncertain. The US political process 
is in a state of flux.
Contemporary issues in the Americas30 #1: The election of Barack Obama - a new era? 31
NOTES
1 The concept of realignment rests upon a theory of party systems. The history of the parties 
can, it is said, be divided into distinct periods or eras. For his part, Walter Dean Burnham 
talked about 30-36 year periods. Within each of these periods there is a dominant and a 
subordinate party. In a celebrated metaphor Samuel Lubell talked about one party as the sun 
and other as the moon. The “sun party” is electorally predominant and largely sets the politi-
cal and ideological agenda. Although the “moon party” will periodically win national contests, 
it is on the terms defined by the “sun party”. Although realignment theorists concede that 
there can be a drawn-out process of “secular realignment” such as the change in the voting 
patterns among white Southerners as they shifted from the Democrats to the Republicans, 
there is an emphasis on “critical” elections. A critical election – such as 1896 or 1932 – marks 
the dividing line between eras. It will often be preceded by a period of electoral uncertainty: 
“The critical realignment is characteristically associated with short-lived but very intense 
disruptions of traditional patterns of voting behaviour. Majority parties become minori-
ties; politics which was once competitive becomes noncompetitive or, alternatively, hitherto 
one-party areas now become arenas of intense partisan competition; and large blocks of the 
active electorate – minorities, to be sure, but perhaps involving as much as a fifth to a third 
of the voters – shift their partisan allegiance” (Walter Dean Burnham, quoted in Mike Davis, 
“Obama at Manassas”, New Left Review, March / April, 2009, 9.
2 Harold Meyerson, “A Real Realignment”, The Washington Post, November 7 2008, A19, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/06/AR2008110602571.html
3 John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira, “Back to the Future: The re-emergence of the emerging 
Democratic majority”, The American Prospect, June 19 2007, 
 http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=back_to_the_future061807
4 Karl Rove (President Bush’s chief electoral strategist), was also lured by notions of realign-
ment. He talked of a lasting Republican majority and a process of “rolling realignment”.
5 David R. Mayhew, Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2004)
6 Gallup (2009), Democrats’ 2008 Advantage in Party ID Largest Since ‘83, January 23, http://
www.gallup.com/poll/113947/Democrats-2008-Advantage-Party-Largest.aspx
7 Polling Report (2009), State of the Union, http://www.pollingreport.com/
8 National Election Studies (2009), The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior 
- Government Guaranteed Job/Standard of Living (1) 1956-2002, http://www.electionstudies.
org/nesguide/toptable/tab4a_4a.htm
9 Bartels, Larry (2008), “How Obama Survived the Culture War”, The American 
Prospect – Ezra Klein Archive, http://www.prospect.org/csnc/blogs/ezraklein_
archive?month=11&year=2008&base_name=guest_post_larry_bartels
10 CNN Election Center 2008 (2008), President - National Exit Poll, http://edition.cnn.com/
ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val=USP00p2
11 National Election Studies (2009a), The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Be-
havior - Liberal-Conservative Self-Identification 1972-2004, http://www.electionstudies.org/
nesguide/toptable/tab3_1.htm
12 Split-ticket voting is where a voter backs candidates from a different party (perhaps for the 
president and the House of Representatives) at the same election. 
13 Dalton, Russell J., The Partisan Dealignment Debate: The Changing Nature of Party Identifi-
cation in American Politics, Paper delivered at the March 2004 annual meeting of the Mid-
west Political Science Association, (Chicago, 2004.)
14 Pew Research Center (2009), GOP Party Identification Slips Nationwide and in Pennsylva-
nia: No Indication of Further Democratic Gains, April 29, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1207/
republican-party-identification-slips-nationwide-pennsylvania-specter-switch
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